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NOT MY BROTHER’S KEEPER  
ACCOUNTING FIRMS FACE INCREASED 
SECURITIES CLAIMS FOR AUDITS 
PERFORMED BY AFFILIATES IN OTHER 
COUNTRIES 
BRYAN J. HALL† 
INTRODUCTION  
Call it “Enron” with an Italian accent.  On Christmas Eve 
2003, Parmalat, the world’s largest dairy producer and Italy’s 
eighth largest public company, declared bankruptcy in the wake 
of a massive corporate fraud.1  Parmalat’s Chief Executive and 
Chief Financial Officer admitted to cooking the books, and 
investigators discovered that as much as $12 billion in assets, 
including a $4.9 billion bank account, simply did not exist.2  
Parmalat’s bankruptcy, coming just two years after the 
spectacular collapse of Enron3 and the bankruptcy of WorldCom,4 
 
†  Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Baruch College. I would like to thank 
Cheryl L. Wade, the Dean Harold F. McNiece Professor of Law at St. John’s 
University School of Law, for her suggestions and input to this Note. Additionally, I 
would like to acknowledge and thank my family for their unending love and support. 
1  See STEWART HAMILTON & ALICIA MICKLETHWAIT, GREED AND CORPORATE 
FAILURE: THE LESSONS from RECENT DISASTERS 153 (2006); Peter Gumbel, How It 
Went Sour, TIME, Dec. 13, 2004, at A2, available at http://www.time.com/ 
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1009674,00.html; Gail Edmonson, David Fairlamb & 
Nanette Byrnes, The Milk Just Keeps on Spilling at Parmalat, BUS. WK., Jan. 26, 
2004, at 54, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
04_04/b3867074_mz054.htm. 
2  See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 163–65; Gail Edmondson & 
Laura Cohn, How Parmalat Went Sour, BUS. WK., Jan. 12, 2004, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_02/b3865053_mz054.htm; 
Edmonson, Fairlamb & Byrnes, supra note 1. 
3  On December 2, 2001, Enron declared what was then the largest corporate 
bankruptcy in history, bringing an end to what had been a $60 billion company just 
one year earlier. See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 33–34, 46. 
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shattered the view that Europe might escape America’s 
accounting scandals.5  As had happened in the wake of Enron 
and WorldCom, the focus in the Parmalat investigation turned 
immediately to its outside auditors, two of the biggest names in 
accounting, Deloitte & Touche and Grant Thornton.6  Local 
partners of Grant Thornton were arrested, and Deloitte-Italy was 
placed under investigation.7  Grant Thornton International 
expelled its Italian member firm.8  And investors filed a civil suit 
against the auditors, claiming billions of dollars in losses.9  
The investors’ lawsuit took a novel approach.  They alleged 
that Parmalat’s Italian auditors, Deloitte & Touche S.p.A. and 
Grant Thornton S.p.A., committed primary violations of section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193410 by either 
participating in or acquiescing in Parmalat’s fraud.11  Section 
10(b), the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 
 
4  On July 21, 2002, WorldCom succeeded Enron as the largest corporate 
bankruptcy in history, having reported nearly $11 billion in nonexistent income. See 
HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 59, 72. 
5  See Corporate Scandals: Déjà Vu All Over Again?, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2003, 
at 73. U.S. corporate governance was once viewed as the “gold standard,” Roger 
Leeds, Breach of Trust: Leadership in a Market Economy, 25 HARV. INT’L REV. 76, 79 
(2003), available at http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1164, but its 
luster had, in fact, faded years before the Enron scandal. See Corporate Scandals: 
Déjà Vu All Over Again?, supra. By contrast, in Europe there were “claims that 
corporate governance [had] been improving” until Parmalat unfolded. Id.  
6  See Joseph Weber & Gail Edmondson, Auditors Asleep at the Wheel. Sound 
Familiar?, BUS. WK., Jan. 12, 2004, at 47, available at http://www.businessweek. 
com/magazine/content/04_02/b3865055_mz054.htm. 
7  See Edmonson, Fairlamb & Byrnes, supra note 1. 
8  See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 640 F. Supp. 2d 243, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
9  See Third Amended Consol. Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Fed. 
Sec. Laws at ¶ 62, In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(No. 04 MD 1653(LAK)). The investors sued Parmalat’s current Italian auditors, 
Deloitte & Touche S.p.A., as well as the global accounting network that it belongs to, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (“DTT” or “the global firm”). See In re Parmalat Sec. 
Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Along with DTT, the investors sued 
Deloitte & Touche LLP, DTT’s U.S. member firm. See id. at 446–47. These entities 
are collectively referred to as “the Deloitte Defendants” in this Note. Along with 
Deloitte, investors sued Parmalat’s former Italian auditors, Grant Thornton S.p.A., 
and the global accounting firm it belonged to, Grant Thornton International (“GTI”). 
See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245–46. Grant Thornton S.p.A. was subsequently 
expelled from GTI for its role in the Parmalat audit. See id. at 252. Together with 
GTI, the investors sued the U.S. member firm, Grant Thornton LLP. See id. at 245–
46. These entities are collectively referred to as “the Grant Thornton Defendants.” 
10 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
11 See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245–48; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 446–
48.  
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1934, prohibits the knowing use of a manipulative or deceptive 
document or other device in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities.12  The investors sued not only Parmalat’s Italian 
auditors but also the global accounting firms they belonged to 
and the U.S. member firms of each of these global accounting 
firms.13  In this way, the investors were able to reach the deep-
pocketed U.S. accounting firm by means of a “stepping stone” 
approach.14  The investors first alleged that the global accounting 
firms controlled the Italian auditors and were, therefore, 
vicariously liable for the Italians’ bad acts.15  Next, the investors 
claimed that the U.S. accounting firms, by virtue of their size and 
financial resources, controlled the global firms and should be 
secondarily liable for the misdeeds of the Italian auditors.16 
In early 2009, the U.S. district court in Parmalat ruled that 
the global accounting firms can be held vicariously liable for the 
Italian auditors’ primary violations of section 10(b) under the 
common law theory of agency, which requires only a right to 
control, not actual control, of the alleged wrongdoer.17  The court 
also found that the investors could sue the global accounting 
firms under section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934,18 which imposes liability on a party that controls anyone 
who commits a primary violation of the Act.19  Section 20(a) is 
distinguishable from section 10(b) in that 20(a) provides an 
affirmative defense if the control defendant acted in good faith 
 
12 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance.”). 
13 See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245 (discussing the claims against the Grant 
Thornton Defendants); Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (discussing various claims 
against the Deloitte Defendants); see also infra Part II.B.  
14 See James Roberts & Andrew Forsyth, The Risks of Globalisation, LEGAL WK., 
Sept. 17, 2009, at 26, available at http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/ 
1533842/professional-negligence-the-risks-globalisation. 
15 See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245–52; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 447, 
451–59. 
16 See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 252–54; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 458–
60.  
17 See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 246–52; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 451–
55. 
18 See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 255; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 455–56. 
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006). The statute provides that “[e]very person who, 
directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this 
chapter . . . is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not 
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of 
action.” Id.  
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and did not directly or indirectly induce the violation.20  Turning 
to the U.S. accounting firms, the court found that they could be 
subject to secondary liability for controlling the global firms, 
which, in turn, controlled the Italian auditors.21  
This Note argues that plaintiffs who sue a global accounting 
firm or a U.S. accounting firm for an audit performed by an 
affiliated accounting firm should be required to prove that the 
global or U.S. firm actually controlled the audit at issue in the 
litigation.22  Plaintiffs should not be permitted to bypass the 
express statutory limitations that Congress has placed on 
secondary liability in the Securities Exchange Act by applying 
broader common law principles of vicarious liability.  The use of 
common law vicarious liability in section 10(b) litigation conflicts 
with Supreme Court precedent, which has taken a narrow view 
of liability under 10(b), particularly given that Congress has 
limited secondary liability by including a good faith defense in 
section 20(a).  Furthermore, this Note argues that public policy 
considerations and organizational factors caution against  
 
 
20 See id.; see also infra Part III.B.1. 
21 See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 252–55; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 458–
60. While the Parmalat Court accepted plaintiffs’ securities fraud claims premised 
on agency liability, it rejected claims that the U.S. auditors should be held liable as 
the alter ego of their Italian counterparts because plaintiffs failed to allege a lack of 
corporate formalities, intermingling of funds, common leadership, or domination by 
the U.S. firms of their counterparts. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 
278, 296–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). To establish a claim of alter ego, plaintiffs must show 
“complete domination of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked, 
and . . . that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the 
plaintiff which resulted in plaintiff’s injury.” In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 454 F. 
Supp. 2d 187, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
The Parmalat plaintiffs appear not to have pursued a claim of enterprise liability, 
which “provides a horizontal form of liability” to hold the various subsidiaries of a 
business enterprise jointly liable. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 
26 J. CORP. L. 479, 526 (2001); see Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 1 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that “under the single-enterprise 
rule, liability can be found between sister companies”). This may have been due to 
“[t]he recurrent rejection of traditional enterprise liability by some [courts].” Alfred 
F. Conard, Enterprise Liability and Insider Trading, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 913, 
928 (1992). 
22 This Note addresses claims against accounting firms based on vicarious or 
secondary liability when the accounting firms did not conduct or actually control the 
audit at issue in the litigation. Accounting firms can be held liable for their own 
primary violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provided that all the 
elements of the cause of action are met. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994); infra note 63. 
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imposing secondary liability on independent, but affiliated, 
accounting firms, absent a showing of actual control of the audit 
at issue in the litigation. 
This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses the 
development of the modern global structure of accounting firms 
and analyzes recent district court decisions in which accounting 
firms have not been held liable for audits performed by affiliated 
accounting firms.  Part I also considers the implications of three 
Supreme Court decisions that rejected secondary liability under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.  Part II explores the 
facts leading up to Parmalat’s bankruptcy and the district court’s 
decision to apply agency and control liability to global and U.S. 
accounting firms.  Part III argues that the court in Parmalat 
erred in applying common law agency liability to accounting 
firms under section 10(b) for the actions of legally separate 
affiliated firms.  Rather, the court should have applied the 
secondary liability provision that Congress expressly provided in 
section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.  Turning to section 
20(a), Part III argues that the more rigorous actual control of the 
audit standard should apply to secondary liability claims against 
accounting firms, rather than the less rigorous power to control 
standard.  Finally, Part III applies the actual control of the audit 
standard to the facts of Parmalat and demonstrates how, under 
this standard, public policy and organizational considerations are 
adequately addressed, while providing for meaningful recovery 
against accounting firms that actually control the audit at issue 
in the litigation. 
I. MEGA FIRMS AND MASSIVE LIABILITY 
A. A Nontraditional Global Structure 
From the outside, accounting firms look like any modern 
international corporation, with global headquarters and branches 
in different countries.  But despite their efforts to present a 
uniform global brand, accounting firms are actually associations 
of distinct national partnerships, and the individual national 
firms have limited involvement in and, presumably, liability for 
the actions of their affiliates in other countries.23  This unique 
 
23 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING PROFESSION, FINAL REPORT OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING PROFESSION TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT 
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structure has developed out of a need to meet the demands of 
large global clients, while adhering to national laws on 
ownership and practice, which vary greatly by state and 
country.24   
From fairly modest beginnings as small partnerships of 
practitioners, accounting firms grew rapidly in the second half of 
the twentieth century to match the size and scale of their 
multinational corporate clients.25  As they expanded globally, 
accounting firms retained their traditional partnership structure 
because this structure is often mandated by law26 in part to 
ensure that junior accountants develop their practical experience 
and professional judgment by working alongside more seasoned 
professionals.27  In the United States, many states continue to 
require that licensed public accountants own a majority stake in 
any accounting practice licensed to do business in the state.28  
Similarly, many foreign countries impose partnership structures 
on accounting firms or prohibit foreign-owned firms from 
 
OF THE TREASURY V:10–11 (2008) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT], 
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/acap/docs/final-report.pdf. 
Then-Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., commissioned the report to 
examine the current state of the auditing profession and to develop 
recommendations for making the profession more sustainable. See id. at I:1. The 
Advisory Committee could not agree on changes to private securities litigation 
involving accounting firms, but it did recommend that the firms provide greater 
information to the public. See id. at II:8–9.  
24 See id. at V:10. 
25 See id. at V:4–5, V:10; GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A 
HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
ACCOUNTING 298–301, 348–49 (1998). 
26 See UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AUDITS OF 
PUBLIC COMPANIES 7–9 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08163.pdf. The Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) prepared this report as part of an ongoing initiative to assist Congress in 
examining the highly concentrated market for public company audits. See id. at 2. 
Although audit market concentration may limit a company’s choice in selecting an 
auditor, the GAO found “no compelling need” for Congress to act. See id. at 4–6.  
27 See DAVID GRAYSON ALLEN & KATHLEEN MCDERMOTT, ACCOUNTING FOR 
SUCCESS: A HISTORY OF PRICE WATERHOUSE IN AMERICA 1890–1990, at 7–8 (1993); 
PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 25, at 201–02. 
28 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10; CENTER FOR 
AUDIT QUALITY, REPORT OF THE MAJOR PUBLIC COMPANY AUDIT FIRMS TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE AUDITING 
PROFESSION 23 n.5 (2008) [hereinafter CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY], available at 
http://www.thecaq.org/publicpolicy/data/TRData2008-01-23-FullReport.pdf (“state 
laws require audit firms to be owned to a substantial degree by CPAs”). 
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operating within their borders.29  These ownership laws have 
prevented the development of global accounting corporations, 
and, as a result, today all global accounting firms operate as 
networks of nationally owned partnerships.30   
Within this network structure, accounting firms remain 
legally separate and distinct entities.31  The primary relationship 
between the various national partnerships is their membership 
in the global accounting network, or global firm.32  Under the 
umbrella of the global firm, the national accounting firms share a 
common brand name and apply common standards and 
procedures established by the global firm.33  The global firm does 
not perform audits but sets the standards and procedures that its 
member firms apply, monitors compliance with those standards 
and procedures, and coordinates activities at a global level.34  
Because their role is primarily that of a standard setter and 
caretaker of the brand name, these global firms are typically 
organized as limited liability, nonprofit entities.35 
 
29 See Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, Nos. 00 Civ. 2284(DLC), 00 Civ. 2498(DLC), 
2002 WL 826847, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2002) (acknowledging accounting firm’s 
argument that “the laws of many nations in which its member firms operate prohibit 
the operation of foreign accounting firms”); ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra 
note 23, at V:10. 
30 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10 (“[T]he 
development of [accounting] networks grew out of a need to comply with country-
specific regulations, which . . . mandate that auditing firms be controlled and owned 
by locally licensed professionals.”). 
31 See id. at V:13–14. 
32 See id. at V:14. 
33 See id. at V:10.  
34 See id. at V:14–15. While setting standards, monitoring compliance, and 
coordinating global activities are strong evidence of control, courts have generally 
found them to be insufficient to establish liability against global accounting firms. 
See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
35 See CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY, supra note 28, at 5–21 (discussing the 
organizational structures of the six largest global accounting networks). BDO 
International is incorporated in the Netherlands as BDO Global Coordination B.V. 
Id. at 5. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu has been established as a verein under Swiss 
law. Id. at 8. In German, “ ‘Verein’ means association, society, club or union.” In re 
Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting CASSEL’S 
GERMAN DICTIONARY 662 (1978)). Ernst & Young Global Limited is a private 
company limited by guarantee under United Kingdom law. CENTER FOR AUDIT 
QUALITY, supra note 28, at 12. Grant Thornton International Ltd. is a private 
company limited by guarantee in England and Wales. Id. at 15. KPMG International 
operates as a Swiss cooperative. Id. at 19. Lastly, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
International Limited is an English private company limited by guarantee. Id. at 21. 
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This global network structure enables modern accounting 
firms to achieve several important organizational and business 
objectives.  First, the network structure has, until recently, 
insulated the national member firms from liability for one 
another’s alleged wrongdoing.36  Second, nationally oriented 
accounting firms are better able to understand and comply with 
national standards on accounting, auditing, independence, and 
education.37  Third, a coordinated approach enables national 
firms to operate on a global scale by sharing resources to service 
multinational clients under a common, recognized brand name.38  
Fourth, by applying international standards and procedures, the 
firms ensure a consistent quality of work globally.39 
Although this global network structure has many 
advantages, it has one significant disadvantage: Accounting 
firms have had to become very large to match the size of their 
corporate clients, and this has resulted in the industry being 
dominated by a handful of large global accounting firms.  To 
address the size and scale of many of their clients, accounting 
firms consolidated during the 1980s and 1990s through a series 
of “mega mergers.”40  By the end of the 1990s, the eight largest 
accounting firms had consolidated through mergers into five 
firms.41  With the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 in the 
wake of the Enron scandal,42 this number was reduced to just 
four large global accounting firms.43  The four remaining mega 
 
36 See infra Part I.C. 
37 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at II:8, V:10 (“[T]o 
effectively operate in foreign jurisdictions, auditing firms . . . need to employ 
individuals familiar with the accounting, legal, cultural, linguistic, and business 
practices of each relevant jurisdiction.”). 
38 See id. at V:10. 
39 See id.; see also International Federation of Accountants, Forum of Firms, 
http://www.ifac.org/Forum_of_Firms/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2010) (discussing global 
accounting firms’ role in promoting compliance with international standards by their 
member firms). 
40 See generally SAMUEL A. CYPERT, FOLLOWING THE MONEY: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF ACCOUNTING’S FIRST MEGA-MERGER 189–222 (1991) (discussing the first mega 
merger that created the global accounting firm now known as KPMG).  
41 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:4–5; GAO REPORT, 
supra note 26, at 8–9. 
42 See infra Part I.D. 
43 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:4–5; GAO REPORT, 
supra note 26, at 75 (“[T]he overall market for public company audits continues to be 
highly concentrated among the largest accounting firms.”). 
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firms44 audit ninety-eight percent of the 1,500 largest public 
companies in the United States,45 and ninety-four percent of all 
audit fees paid by publicly listed U.S. companies are remitted to 
these four accounting firms.46  While smaller and midsized 
accounting firms continue to grow and pursue ever larger clients, 
their share of the overall market for large public company audits 
remains small.47  The highly concentrated nature of the audit 
industry has already had a negative impact on auditor 
independence, conflicts of interest, and the ability of public 
companies to switch auditors.48  The loss of one of the four 
remaining large global accounting firms to a massive civil 
judgment from a suit like Parmalat would likely result in 
inadequate choice and increased cost for companies, as well as 
impaired auditor independence, all of which would greatly harm 
both public companies and the investing public.49  Public policy, 
therefore, strongly cautions against expanding accounting firm 
liability at a time when the industry is highly concentrated and 
extremely vulnerable to large tort judgments. 
B. “Public Watchdog” Accounting 
Along with the rapid growth brought about by globalization, 
one of the most important elements in the development of the 
modern accounting industry was the requirement that all 
publicly listed corporations undergo annual audits of their 
financial statements.50  In the United States, this requirement 
was introduced in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.51  
 
44 The four largest global accounting networks are PricewaterhouseCoopers 
International Ltd., Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young Global Ltd., and 
KPMG International. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10–12.  
45 See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 4. 
46 See id. at 75. 
47 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:7; GAO REPORT, supra 
note 26, at 15–18. 
48 See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 21–24. Public companies today have fewer 
choices in selecting an outside auditor because frequently only one or two of the 
largest firms provides the breadth of services and has the industry expertise that the 
client needs. See id. at 15–18. 
49 See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 32–36. 
50 See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 25, at 274 (“Passage [of the Securities 
Exchange Act] increased demand for accounting services . . . . The legislation [also] 
conferred upon CPAs a legally defined social obligation: to assist in creating and 
sustaining investor confidence in the public capital markets.”). 
51 See Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the 
PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1145–46 (2007). 
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Publicly traded companies listed on U.S. exchanges must file 
annual reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) that have been certified by “independent public 
accountants.”52  Corporations pay for their outside auditors to 
conduct these audits, but the investing public is the ultimate 
beneficiary of audited financial reports.53 
By mandating regular audits of all public companies, the 
Securities Exchange Act imposed a dual responsibility on 
auditors: to advise and serve their clients and to protect the 
public trust.54  This dual role has led to an “expectation gap,” 
where shareholders expect auditors to “root out management 
fraud,”55 whereas auditors view their role as “provid[ing] 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement.”56  However, when fraud is uncovered at 
a public company, investors and the public, somewhat naturally, 
ask why the auditors failed to detect it sooner.57  Beginning in the 
1970s, the public’s expectation that auditors would root out fraud 
led to a dramatic increase in litigation as plaintiffs and courts 
came to view accounting firms as a “deep pocket” source for 
recompensing aggrieved shareholders.58 
 
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01–.2-07 (2010). 
53 See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 25, at 273–74. Following passage of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “[r]egulators promoted audited financial 
statements as the means by which stockholders could exercise their ownership 
rights.” Id. at 274. 
54 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that: 
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s 
financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility 
transcending any employment relationship with the client. The 
independent public accountant performing this special function owes 
ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well 
as to the investing public. This “public watchdog” function demands that 
the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times and 
requires complete fidelity to the public trust. 
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18 (1984). 
55 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at VII:14–15; THOMAS A. 
KING, MORE THAN A NUMBERS GAME: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING 67 (2006). 
See generally Marianne Ojo, Eliminating the Audit Expectations Gap: Myth or 
Reality?, MUNICH PERSONAL REPEC ARCHIVE, Feb. 2006, http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/232/1/MPRA_paper_232.pdf.  
56 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at VII:15. 
57 See id. at VII:14–15. 
58 See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 25, at 375–78 (“Accountants are popular 
targets of the plaintiff’s bar, sometimes because of the notion that firms have the 
resources (deep pockets) to reward the litigants.”). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1133 (2010) 
2010] NOT MY BROTHER’S KEEPER 1143 
C. Accounting Scandals and the Search for Deep Pockets 
In recent years, accounting firms have faced increased 
liability for not detecting fraud or preventing financial 
misstatements by their clients, resulting in billions of dollars in 
settlements and judgments.59  Investors frequently react by suing 
the corporation’s accounting firms for violations of the Securities 
Exchange Act.60  While litigation has become a cost of doing 
business for accounting firms,61 the primary risk to their long-
term sustainability comes from the potential “big ticket” suit for 
billions of dollars that could bankrupt a firm.62  This risk is 
particularly acute in cases where the accounting firm does not 
participate in or control the audit but is only affiliated with the 
accounting firm that actually performed the audit.  
1. Section 10(b) and Secondary Liability 
Plaintiffs frequently bring claims against auditors under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which 
prohibits the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.63  In a suit 
against an accounting firm, plaintiffs typically claim that the 
auditors knowingly or recklessly ignored fraud that was 
perpetrated by company insiders, while issuing clean audit 
 
59 See CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY, supra note 28, at 49 (stating that the six 
largest U.S. accounting firms paid out $3.68 billion to settle lawsuits related to 
public company audits between 1996 and 2007).  
60 See infra Part I.C.1 for a discussion of claims under section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange act. See infra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of claims under section 
20(a). 
61 See CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY, supra note 28, at 27–28. Total litigation 
costs for the six largest U.S. accounting firms represented 15.1% of audit-related 
revenues, the firms’ largest expense after employee and partner compensation and 
client-related expenses. See id. 
62 See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1642–44 (2006). 
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). Pursuant to 10(b), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has promulgated Rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). To establish 
a violation of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must show a material 
misrepresentation or omission; scienter; a connection between the misrepresentation 
and the purchase or sale of securities; reliance on the misrepresentation; economic 
loss; and loss causation. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 
U.S. 148, 157 (2008). In 2010, after the Parmalat decision was rendered, the Second 
Circuit limited private suits under section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 against accountants and 
other secondary actors to instances in which “false statements [are] attributed to the 
secondary-actor defendant at the time of dissemination.” Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. 
Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2010).  
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opinions of the company’s financial statements on which the 
plaintiffs or the market relied.64  Section 10(b) did not establish 
an express private cause of action; the cause of action was 
judicially created.65  As a result, courts have struggled with the 
precise contours of the private cause of action, particularly when 
plaintiffs sue both primary violators and secondary parties who 
have some relationship with the primary violator of 10(b).66  
Adding to the complexity, in cases involving accounting firms, 
plaintiffs and courts often conflate legally distinct entities by 
using the common brand name to refer to all the defendants.67 
Although federal district and appellate courts have generally 
treated the 10(b) private cause of action as a broad remedy,68 
most courts have rejected attempts to hold U.S. accounting firms 
and global firms secondarily liable for the work of an affiliated 
accounting firm in another country.69  This has frequently been 
 
64 See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 283–84 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005).  
65 The private cause of action under 10(b) was first recognized in Kardon v. Nat’l 
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court 
acknowledged its existence in a footnote in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & 
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). 
66 See In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 172–73 (D. 
Mass. 2002). 
67 See Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 288–89 (stating that plaintiffs’ use of the 
terms “Deloitte” and “Grant Thornton” to refer to multiple defendants was “ill-
advised”); Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, Nos. 00 Civ. 2284(DLC), 00 Civ. 2498(DLC), 
2002 WL 826847, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2002). The Cromer Court denied summary 
judgment for the global firm, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, in part because the audit 
report was “signed ‘Deloitte & Touche,’ in a cursive signature.” Id. However, 
“Deloitte & Touche” is not the global firm’s name; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu is. See 
id. at *1. Deloitte’s member firm in Bermuda operated under the name “Deloitte & 
Touche (Bermuda).” Id. 
68 See Laperriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc. 526 F.3d 715, 725 & n.21 (11th Cir. 
2008) (finding a seven-to-one split among the other federal courts of appeals in favor 
of applying common law vicarious liability to section 10(b)). The Third Circuit has 
generally limited secondary liability to section 20(a). See Sharp v. Coopers & 
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 182–83 (3d Cir. 1981); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 
880, 884–85 (3d Cir. 1975). Along with the Third Circuit, a number of district courts 
have rejected vicarious liability claims brought under 10(b). See, e.g., In re 
Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Mass. 1997); Converse, Inc. v. 
Norwood Venture Corp., No. 96 CIV. 3745(HB), 1997 WL 742534, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 1, 1997); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 
584, 612–13 (D.N.J. 1996). 
69 See, e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., No. 09 Civ. 0118(VM), 2010 WL 
3341636, at *71–73 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010) (“[A]llegations of generalized control 
are insufficient to state a plausible claim of coordinating-entity control over its 
member firms in the auditing context.”); Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers LLP, No. 03 Civ. 0613 GBD, 2004 WL 112948, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 
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due to the plaintiffs’ relatively weak factual arguments regarding 
the relationship between the foreign audit firm that actually 
performed the audit and the global or U.S. firm.70  Plaintiffs have 
had some success with facts showing that the accounting firm 
was actually involved in the particular audit71 or employed the 
individual alleged to have committed the wrongdoing.72  
Plaintiffs, however, have generally been unsuccessful in suing 
global accounting firms based on a theory of vicarious liability 
under section 10(b).73 
In contrast with some lower courts, the Supreme Court has 
consistently read section 10(b) quite narrowly, limiting the 
private cause of action to the express language of the statute.74  
On three occasions, the Court has refused to recognize secondary 
liability under section 10(b).75  In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
the Supreme Court rejected secondary liability premised on the 
auditor’s alleged negligence in failing to properly audit a 
brokerage fund, finding that the statute required, at a minimum, 
recklessness by the defendant.76  The plaintiffs in Ernst & Ernst 
claimed that the auditors had failed to conduct proper audits of 
the company, which would have uncovered the wrongdoing at the 
 
2004) (“[C]ourts have declined to treat different [accounting] firms as a single entity, 
holding them liable for one another’s acts, simply because they shared an 
associational name and/or collaborated on certain aspects of a transaction.”); In re 
Asia Pulp & Paper Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re 
WorldCom, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003 WL 21488087, at *10 
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003); Lernout & Hauspie, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 173; Howard v. 
Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 661–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). But 
see In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
70 See Nuevo Mundo Holdings, 2004 WL 112948, at *3; Asia Pulp, 293 F. Supp. 
2d at 396; WorldCom, 2003 WL 21488087, at *10; Lernout & Hauspie, 230 F. Supp. 
2d at 173.  
71 See Cromer, 2002 WL 826847, at *2–3 (refusing to dismiss the complaint 
because the global accounting firm’s name and logo were included on the audit 
opinion, and the lead partner on the audit was a member of the global firm’s 
leadership).  
72 See Sharp, 649 F.2d at 182–83. 
73 See supra note 69; In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 296–97 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting a claim of alter ego liability against the Deloitte 
Defendants); Lernout & Hauspie, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 173 (rejecting a claim of agency 
liability against a global accounting firm).  
74 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (“[T]he text of the statute controls our decision.”). 
75 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 552 U.S. at 158, 166–67; Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 
176–78; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206, 215 (1976). 
76 See 425 U.S. at 190, 215. 
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heart of the fraud.77  Plaintiffs conceded, however, that there was 
no evidence that the auditors had intentionally participated in or 
aided the fraud, claiming only that the failure to conduct a 
proper audit was “inexcusable negligence.”78  Relying on the text 
of section 10(b) and congressional intent, the Court concluded 
that the private cause of action under 10(b) does not reach 
“negligent wrongdoing,”79 limiting claims to defendants who 
exhibit scienter.80  The Court, thus, refused to “broaden the class 
of plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability upon 
accountants . . . under the Acts.”81 
The Court continued to apply its narrow construction of 
section 10(b) in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A., in which the Court rejected a claim of 
secondary liability under 10(b) against a trustee for allegedly 
aiding a fraud by bond issuers who had defaulted.82  Plaintiffs 
sought to hold Central Bank liable for aiding and abetting83 the 
fraud.  Because Central Bank had been aware that the value of 
the land used to secure the bonds had not appreciated in value as 
predicted, it delayed conducting an independent appraisal and 
the bond issuer defaulted.84  Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument 
and overturning the decisions of nearly every circuit court to 
consider the issue,85 the Supreme Court found that the language 
of section 10(b) did not prohibit—or even address—aiding and 
abetting a fraud,86 and the plaintiffs had failed to establish that 
these defendants made a material misstatement or omission.87  
 
77 See id. at 190. 
78 Id. at 190 n.5.  
79 Id. at 210. 
80 See id. at 202 (“There is no indication . . . that § 10(b) was intended to 
proscribe conduct not involving scienter.”). 
81 Id. at 214 n.33.  
82 511 U.S. 164, 176–78, 191 (1994). 
83 As defined by the Tenth Circuit in the Central Bank litigation, aiding and 
abetting liability required a primary violation of section 10(b), recklessness by the 
aider and abettor as to the existence of the violation, and substantial assistance 
given by the aider and abettor to the party that committed the 10(b) violation. See 
id. at 168. 
84 See id. at 167–68. 
85 See id. at 194 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that nearly every circuit 
had approved of some form of secondary liability for aiding and abetting under 
section 10(b)). 
86 See id. at 173 (majority opinion). The Court found that aiding and abetting 
“reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all.” Id. at 176.  
87 See id. at 177. 
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The Court thus refused to read the judicially created private 
cause of action more broadly than the statutory language.88 
More recently, in 2008, the Court again rejected secondary 
liability that had been packaged as “scheme liability”89 in 
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc.90  The 
Stoneridge plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, which were 
customers and vendors of the company that had committed the 
fraud, should be held liable for engaging in arrangements with 
the company that made its financial position appear healthier 
than it was.91  While acknowledging that the defendants’ actions 
were “deceptive,”92 the Court concluded that plaintiffs had failed 
to establish that they relied on the defendants’ deceptive acts.93  
In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that “Section 10(b) does not 
incorporate common-law fraud into federal law” and cautioned 
against reading 10(b) broadly in the absence of direction from 
Congress.94  The Court also noted that its decision in Central 
Bank had resulted in calls for Congress to expand secondary 
liability under 10(b) but that Congress had actually narrowed the 
private cause of action when it enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).95  While Stoneridge did 
not expressly disclaim all forms of secondary or vicarious liability  
 
 
 
 
88 See id. at 180. 
89 The Ninth Circuit, which until Stoneridge applied scheme liability, described 
it as follows: 
[T]he defendant must have engaged in conduct that had the principal 
purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of fact in furtherance of 
the scheme. It is not enough that a transaction in which a defendant was 
involved had a deceptive purpose and effect; the defendant’s own conduct 
contributing to the transaction or overall scheme must have had a 
deceptive purpose and effect. 
Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub 
nom., Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 552 U.S. 1162 
(2008). 
90 See 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008). 
91 See id. at 152–55. 
92 Id. at 160. 
93 See id.  
94 Id. at 162–63. 
95 See id. at 158 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006)). In enacting the PSLRA, 
Congress directed the SEC to prosecute aiders and abettors, rather than permit 
private suits. See id. Congress also imposed “heightened pleading requirements” on 
suits under 10(b). See id. at 165. 
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under 10(b), it reiterated that, to establish liability under 10(b), 
“[t]he conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the 
elements or preconditions for liability.”96 
2. Section 20(a): Expressly Providing for Secondary Liability 
Given the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the 10(b) 
private cause of action very narrowly, some plaintiffs have 
sought to impose liability against global accounting firms under 
section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.97  Section 
20(a) imposes joint and several liability on any party that 
directly or indirectly controls a party that commits a primary 
violation of the Act.98  To establish liability under 20(a), plaintiffs 
must show both a primary violation of the Act and control of the 
violator by the defendant.99  Section 20(a) enables plaintiffs to 
sue corporate officers, boards of directors, and majority 
shareholders when they control an entity or an individual who 
commits a securities violation.100  Unlike primary liability under 
the Act, however, section 20(a) includes an affirmative defense 
for control persons that can prove that they acted in good faith 
and did not induce the underlying violation.101  Therefore, where 
a primary violation and a control relationship are established, 
the control person is presumed liable by virtue of its control, 
unless it can establish good faith and an absence of inducement. 
As with suits seeking to impose vicarious liability on 
accounting firms, claims brought under section 20(a) seeking to 
impose control person liability on affiliated accounting firms 
have, until recently, been largely unsuccessful.  In particular, 
courts have rejected imposing control person liability on 
 
96 Id. at 158 (emphasis added); see SEC v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 
342, 355 (D.N.J. 2009) (“From Central Bank to Stoneridge, the Supreme Court has 
consistently narrowed the class of defendants reachable by the implied cause of 
action under Section 10(b).”). 
97 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006). 
98 See id.  
99 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)).  
100 See Loftus C. Carson, II, The Liability of Controlling Persons Under the 
Federal Securities Acts, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 263, 278–81 (1997). 
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). There is currently a split among the circuits and 
within the Second Circuit as to whether the elements of good faith and inducement 
are part of a plaintiff’s prima facie case or an affirmative defense. See infra Part 
III.B.1. 
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accounting firms based on membership in a global firm,102 a 
common brand name,103 use of marketing materials that promote 
a single firm identity,104 or the member firm’s representations 
that it was acting as an agent of the global firm.105  Similarly, 
courts have rejected claims that accounting firms should be 
secondarily liable for the actions of their affiliates in 
nonsecurities litigation.106 
D. Arthur Andersen: A Cautionary Tale 
No discussion of auditor liability would be complete without 
mention of Arthur Andersen, the accounting firm that collapsed 
following allegations of involvement in the fraudulent conduct by 
the management of Enron and Andersen’s efforts to cover it up.  
Founded by its namesake in 1913 and regarded as “a great and 
venerable American brand,”107 Andersen ceased doing business 
barely nine months after its largest client, Enron, filed for what 
was then the largest corporate bankruptcy in history.108  
Andersen would later be sued for its audit work for a number of 
clients, including Enron,109 WorldCom,110 and Global Crossing.111  
In many of these suits, plaintiffs alleged that the various 
national accounting firms that operated under the Andersen 
 
102 See In re WorldCom, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003 WL 
21488087, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003). 
103 See Nuevo Mundo Holdings v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, No. 03 Civ. 
0613 GBD, 2004 WL 112948, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004).  
104 See In re Asia Pulp & Paper Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003).  
105 See Star Energy Corp. v. RSM Top-Audit, No. 08 Civ. 00329(DC), 2008 WL 
5110919, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2008). 
106 See, e.g., Nuevo Mundo Holdings, 2004 WL 112948, at *3 (rejecting agency 
claim in a suit for fraud and negligence); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick 
Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 661–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting agency claim in 
employment discrimination suit).  
107 BARBARA LEY TOFFLER, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED, AND THE 
FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN 7 (Doubleday 2004) (2003). 
108 See id. at 213. Andersen’s collapse was the result of a criminal indictment for 
obstruction of justice, id. at 219, which arose from its shredding of “as many as 26 
trunks and 24 boxes” of documents relating to its audits of Enron. Id. at 214.  
109 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “Erisa” Litig., Nos. MDL-1446, 
Civ.A. H-01-3624, Civ.A. H-01-3913, 2003 WL 22962792, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 
2003).  
110 See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003 WL 
21488087, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003). 
111 See In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
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name and the global firm they belonged to, Andersen Worldwide 
Société Coopérative, should be held vicariously liable for the 
actions of Arthur Andersen LLP,  the U.S. accounting firm that 
actually performed the audits.112  The courts, however, rejected 
these secondary liability claims, focusing instead on the culpable 
actions of Arthur Andersen LLP.113 
Andersen’s demise resulted not only from its criminal 
obstruction of justice conviction, which a unanimous Supreme 
Court overturned three years later,114 but also from the loss of 
confidence of its clients, partners, and employees.115  Andersen’s 
partnership structure aided in its demise by inhibiting fast 
decisionmaking in response to the Department of Justice’s 
criminal investigation and indictment.116  In addition, Andersen’s 
network structure enabled its member firms to break from the 
U.S. firm in search of “new homes.”117 
In the wake of Enron and Arthur Andersen, Congress acted 
swiftly to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.118  This 
legislation brought sweeping changes to the regulation of 
accounting and financial reporting, including requiring CEOs 
and CFOs of public companies to certify their financial 
statements under civil and criminal penalty, imposing internal 
control reviews of public companies, and establishing the Public 
 
112 See Enron, 2003 WL 22962792, at *9; WorldCom, 2003 WL 21488087, at *9–
10. 
113 See Enron, 2003 WL 22962792, at *9 (finding plaintiffs’ claims that the global 
firm and its member firms were a single entity were “vague” and accepting a 
settlement to resolve the litigation); WorldCom, 2003 WL 21488087, at *10 (rejecting 
a claim of vicarious liability under 10(b) against the global firm because the 
complaint lacked “specific allegations of a conveyance of actual authority” from the 
global firm to Andersen-U.S.). In Global Crossing, the global firm did not move for 
dismissal, for reasons not entirely clear, and the court did not address the issue. See 
322 F. Supp. 2d 324–25 & n.2. 
114 See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005). The 
Supreme Court unanimously overturned Andersen’s conviction on the grounds that 
the trial court’s jury instructions “failed to convey properly the elements of a 
‘corrup[t] persua[sion]’ conviction” under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Id. The Court found 
that the trial judge had omitted the element of “dishonesty” from the jury charge on 
corrupt persuasion, and that the judge had failed to explain that the jury must find 
a nexus between the destruction of the documents and the government proceeding 
that was being obstructed. See id. at 706–07. 
115 See PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 179 
(2002); TOFFLER, supra note 107, at 218–19, 223. 
116 See TOFFLER, supra note 107, at 218–19, 247–48. 
117 See Enron, 2003 WL 22962792, at *9. 
118 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee the accounting 
industry.119  Sarbanes-Oxley also sought to reduce or remove 
conflicts of interest between corporations and their auditors.120  
Congress, however, failed to take any steps to address the issues 
of accounting firm liability and sustainability arising from 
private securities litigation premised on vicarious or secondary 
liability.  The cautionary tale of Arthur Andersen highlights the 
risks faced by global accounting firms, notably the “mass exodus” 
of partners, staff, and clients.121  The tale of Andersen also 
demonstrates the potential impact on the market, because the 
loss of Andersen resulted in the remaining four global accounting 
firms raising audit fees and forgoing clients due to inadequate 
resources.122 
II. PARMALAT: EUROPE’S ENRON 
Not long after the Enron bankruptcy brought down Arthur 
Andersen, the accounting industry in Europe was rocked by a 
homegrown accounting scandal: Parmalat.  Investigations, 
recriminations, and finger-pointing followed swiftly, as did a raft 
of private securities litigation.123  U.S. investors who had lost 
billions investing in Parmalat sued the company’s bankers, 
advisors, and its current and former auditors.124  The plaintiffs 
sought to impose liability on both the accounting firms that had 
actually audited Parmalat—who were accused of complicity in its 
fraud—and the global firms and U.S. accounting firms with  
 
 
 
 
 
119 See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 
J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 96–100 (2007), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/ 
articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.21.1.91.  
120 See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE 
21 (2006). For a detailed discussion of the changes brought about by the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, see ROBERT R. MOELLER, SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE NEW 
INTERNAL AUDITING RULES 9–58 (2004); GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 10–13. For 
an in-depth critique of Sarbanes-Oxley, in particular, the incentives it created for 
greater securities litigation, see BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra, at 38–81. 
121 See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 9. 
122 See id. at 18. 
123 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 640 F. Supp. 2d 243, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re 
Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 446–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
124 See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 245; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 
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which the Italian auditors were affiliated, claiming vicarious 
liability under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.125 
A. From Rural Dairy to Global Scandal 
Parmalat, a name now synonymous with corporate fraud, 
began as a humble dairy in a small Italian town.126  Started in 
1961 by Stefano Tanzi, Parmalat grew rapidly, expanding 
internationally through massive borrowing.127  By 2003, Tanzi 
had transformed Parmalat into the world’s largest dairy business 
and Italy’s eighth largest company.128  But as Parmalat expanded 
globally, a ticking time bomb lay at the center of the corporation: 
false accounting and special purpose entities designed to conceal 
Parmalat’s debt.129  
Reminiscent of Enron, Parmalat’s star shone brightly until 
the moment before it burned out.130  In the year before its 
bankruptcy, Parmalat continued to receive favorable ratings 
from stock analysts and credit rating agencies.131  As Parmalat 
accumulated billions in off balance sheet debt, it reported record 
sales and profits.132  But while its auditors signed off on the 
financial statements, red flags began to appear.133  In January 
2003, Parmalat’s stock fell forty percent below its market high, 
and in May 2003, Parmalat withdrew a $360–600 million bond 
offer due to a lack of interest.134  But business continued as usual 
at Parmalat until November 10, 2003, when it announced that 
the Italian securities regulator had asked the company to clarify 
some of the accounting treatment used in its financial 
 
125 See Parmalat, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 247, 255–56; Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 
449–50. 
126 See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 153–55. 
127 See id. at 154–59. 
128 See Gumbel, supra note 1. 
129 See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 156–61. 
130 For example, less than a year before it would be declared insolvent, Parmalat 
was chosen to join the Italian stock exchange’s prestigious blue chip index, the 
Mib30. See id. at 159. 
131 See id. at 159–60. 
132 See id. at 160. 
133 See id. at 168. 
134 See id. at 159. 
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statements.135  With investors growing nervous and the media 
asking questions, the house of cards collapsed as Parmalat failed 
to make a bond repayment in early December.136  Trading in 
Parmalat’s shares was suspended, and the Chairman and CFO 
resigned.137  Parmalat declared bankruptcy on December 24, 
2003, and three days later, the company was declared insolvent 
when it was discovered that Parmalat’s purported $4.9 billion 
bank account simply did not exist.138  The bankruptcy court 
appointed a corporate turnaround specialist to be Parmalat’s 
bankruptcy commissioner,139 and one of his first acts was to fire 
Parmalat’s auditors.140 
“Europe’s Enron” had the classic hallmarks of an accounting 
scandal.141  Parmalat’s executives were accused of pulling off a 
multi-billion dollar accounting scam and looting the company,142 
while Parmalat’s Italian auditors, Deloitte & Touche S.p.A. and 
Grant Thornton S.p.A., were accused of helping to create and 
sustain the fraud.143  Not only had Parmalat’s auditors signed off 
on its financial statements and its labyrinth of shell companies, 
but Parmalat’s former group auditor, Grant Thornton S.p.A., 
stood accused of orchestrating the numerous offshore 
subsidiaries that had helped Parmalat hide its debt.144  Deloitte 
& Touche, Parmalat’s auditors at the time of its bankruptcy, 
fared no better when it was revealed that a Deloitte affiliate in 
Brazil, which had audited Parmalat’s Brazilian subsidiary, had 
warned the global firm about Parmalat’s accounting in 2001 and 
2002, but Deloitte-Brazil’s warnings went unheeded.145  
 
135 See id. at 161. The Italian securities regulator is the Commissione Nazionale 
per le Società e la Borsa. See Consob, http://www.consob.it/mainen/index.html? 
mode=gfx (last visited Dec. 22, 2010). 
136 See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 162. 
137 See id. at 162–64. 
138 See id. at 164. The fictitious bank account was held by Parmalat’s Cayman 
Islands subsidiary, Bonlat. See id.  
139 Dr. Enrico Bondi was appointed Parmalat’s Extraordinary Bankruptcy 
Commissioner. See id. at 162–64. 
140 See id. at 168. 
141 See id. at 153; Parma Splat—Europe’s Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 17, 2004, at Special Report (2); Peter Gumbel & Jeff Israely, Enron, Italian 
Style, TIME, Jan. 12, 2004, at 53; Weber & Edmondson, supra note 6. 
142 See HAMILTON & MICKLETHWAIT, supra note 1, at 165–66. 
143 See id. at 167–69. 
144 See id. at 168–69. 
145 See id. at 168; Alessandra Galloni & David Reilly, Auditor Raised Parmalat 
Red Flag, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2004, at A3. 
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B. Agency and Control: Two Theories of Liability 
Following news of Parmalat’s fraudulent reporting, lawsuits 
quickly followed.146  In August 2004, Parmalat’s administrator 
sued the company’s former Italian auditors, as well as the global 
accounting firms to which they belonged and their U.S. 
affiliates.147  This suit, which was joined by U.S. investors who 
had lost billions in Parmalat,148 alleged that the global firms to 
which Parmalat’s Italian auditors belonged should be held 
secondarily liable for their Italian member firms’ violations of 
section 10(b).149  Plaintiffs also sued the global firms and their 
U.S. member firms under section 20(a), claiming that they 
controlled the Italian firms that had committed the primary 
violations of the Securities Exchange Act.150  The global 
accounting firms and their U.S. member firms moved to dismiss 
the complaint151 and subsequently moved for summary judgment, 
but the court rejected these motions, finding triable issues of fact 
as to each defendant.152 
The Parmalat plaintiffs advanced two theories of liability 
against the Deloitte Defendants.153  First, the plaintiffs argued 
that the global firm, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (“DTT”), should 
be vicariously liable for Deloitte-Italy’s primary violation of 
section 10(b) based on a common law theory of agency.154  Second, 
the plaintiffs contended that both DTT and Deloitte-U.S. should 
be secondarily liable as control persons under a theory that the 
DTT controlled Deloitte-Italy and Deloitte-U.S. controlled DTT.155 
First addressing the common law agency theory, the court 
held that the law required an “agreement between the principal 
 
146 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
147 See Luisa Beltran, Parmalat Goes After Former Auditors, CBS 
MARKETWATCH.COM (Aug. 18, 2004, 12:25 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
lazards-restructuring-team-readies-for-new-blow-ups.  
148 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
149 See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 449–55. 
150 See id. at 455–60. 
151 See Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
152 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 640 F. Supp. 2d 243, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(rejecting Grant Thornton’s motion); Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 460 (rejecting 
Deloitte’s motion). 
153 The legal claims and key facts are generally the same for the Deloitte 
Defendants and the Grant Thornton Defendants. For the sake of clarity, the 
following analysis only discusses the claims against the Deloitte Defendants. 
154 See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 451–55. 
155 See id. at 455–60. 
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and the agent that the agent will act for the principal, and the 
principal retains a degree of control over the agent,” with the 
control element typically being the central issue.156  To establish 
liability on the part of a secondary party, the agent must have 
actual,157 apparent,158 or implied159 authority to act on the 
principal’s behalf.160  Once the agency relationship has been 
established, the court concluded, the common law principle of 
respondeat superior operates to hold the principal liable for the 
section 10(b) violation by its agent.161 
The court found that the plaintiffs had pled sufficient 
evidence of an agency relationship between DTT and Deloitte-
Italy to expose DTT to vicarious liability for Deloitte-Italy’s 
alleged violation of 10(b).162  The court cited the following facts as 
evidence that DTT controlled Deloitte-Italy: (1) DTT required 
that its member firms use a common audit software; (2) DTT set 
documentation policies and quality control standards; (3) DTT 
conducted compliance and quality control reviews of its member 
firms; (4) DTT retained the right to require that its member 
firms accept or reject audit engagements; and (5) DTT provided 
 
156 Id. at 451. 
157 Actual authority “ ‘is created by direct manifestations from the principal to 
the agent.’ ” Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, Nos. 00 Civ. 2284(DLC), 00 Civ. 2498(DLC), 
2002 WL 826847, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2002) (quoting Reiss v. Société Centrale du 
Groupe des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d 738, 748 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
158 Apparent authority may be “implied from ‘the parties’ words and conduct as 
construed in light of the surrounding circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Riverside 
Research Inst. v. KMGA, Inc., 108 A.D.2d 365, 370, 489 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (1st Dep’t 
1985)). 
159 Implied authority “ ‘is dependent on verbal or other acts by a principal which 
reasonably give an appearance of authority’ in a manner that is ‘brought home to the 
agent.’ ” Id. (quoting Greene v. Hellman, 51 N.Y.2d 197, 204, 412 N.E.2d 1301, 1306, 
433 N.Y.S.2d 75, 80 (1980)). 
160 See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 451–52. 
161 See id. at 451. 
162 See id. at 452–55. In finding that an agency relationship existed, the 
Parmalat Court relied on a Florida state court case, Banco Espirito Santo Int’l, Ltd. 
v. BDO Int’l, 979 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The Florida District Court of 
Appeals found a triable issue of fact as to whether an agency relationship existed 
between the global accounting firm, BDO International, and its U.S. member, BDO 
Seidman. See id. at 1032–33. Following remand, the jury deliberated for one hour 
before reaching its verdict that the U.S. accounting firm, BDO Seidman, was not an 
agent of its global firm and that the global firm did not control its member firm. See 
Erik Larson & Sophia Pearson, BDO Cleared of Responsibility for Seidman Verdict, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 18, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
21070001&sid=acqwPbkZqoWI. 
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some legal and risk management services its member firms.163  
While the court acknowledged that other courts in the Second 
Circuit had rejected claims of agency liability against global 
accounting firms because their structure did “not demonstrate 
control,”164 it buttressed its decision with a single instance in 
which DTT resolved a disagreement between Deloitte-Italy and 
the Deloitte affiliate in Brazil regarding the proper accounting 
treatment for a transaction in the Parmalat audit.165 
Turning to the plaintiffs’ second cause of action, “control 
person” liability under section 20(a), the Parmalat Court found 
that the ability to control the violating party’s actions generally 
was sufficient to satisfy the statute.166  The court rejected 
defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs must prove that the 
global accounting firm actually controlled the transaction at 
issue, because the court found this imposed too high a burden on 
plaintiffs.167  The court further reduced the plaintiffs’ burden, 
finding that the statutory provision that exculpated a defendant 
that “acted in good faith” created an affirmative defense and was 
not an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.168 
As with vicarious liability under 10(b), the court found 
sufficient evidence to sustain the section 20(a) claims against 
DTT and Deloitte-U.S.169  For DTT, the court relied on the same 
analysis it used for vicarious liability under 10(b) to find that 
plaintiffs had stated a claim of control over Deloitte-Italy under 
20(a).170  For Deloitte-U.S., the court drew a line of connection 
from Deloitte-U.S. to DTT to Deloitte-Italy.171  To support this 
chain of inferences, the court relied on the fact that DTT shared 
some executive staff with Deloitte-U.S., most notably the CEO 
and Deloitte-U.S.’s provision of funding and guaranteeing of 
financing for DTT.172  In concluding that Deloitte-U.S. controlled 
 
163 See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 452–53. 
164 Id. at 453 & n.63. 
165 See id. at 453–54. 
166 See id. at 454 n.72, 455–56. 
167 See id. at 456. 
168 See id. at 456–57 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006)). 
169 See id. at 458. 
170 See id. at 456–58; supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
171 See id. at 458–60.  
172 See id. at 458–59  
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DTT, the court also relied on the allegation that Deloitte-U.S. 
influenced DTT’s decision to sell its consulting business.173 
The Parmalat Court’s decision to permit the plaintiffs to 
proceed under both vicarious liability and section 20(a) provided 
impetus for the accounting firms to resolve the case.  In March 
2010, the court approved a settlement with the Deloitte and 
Grant Thornton defendants.174  Under the agreement, plaintiffs 
will receive a total of $15 million from Parmalat’s auditors, with 
the Deloitte Defendants providing $8.5 million.175  Grant 
Thornton International agreed to settle the claims against it for 
$6.5 million, while Grant Thornton U.S. was dismissed with 
prejudice from the case and will not face any liability for the 
losses allegedly caused by its former Italian affiliate’s audits of 
Parmalat.176  The relatively small settlement is due in part to 
settlements that plaintiffs had reached with Parmalat’s Italian 
auditors and other defendants, but it also reflects the difficult 
task that plaintiffs faced in proving that the global and U.S. 
firms controlled the Italian auditors.177 
Although a settlement has been reached, the Parmalat 
Court’s decision highlights the current conflict in securities law 
regarding secondary liability: whether section 20(a) provides the 
sole basis for private causes of action against secondary actors, 
such as affiliated accounting firms, that did not actually commit 
a securities violation.  The Parmalat Court permitted plaintiffs to 
proceed against the accounting firms both under common law 
vicarious liability and control person liability under 20(a),178 
rejecting the argument that vicarious liability under section 10(b) 
is no longer viable in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
 
173 See id. at 460.  
174 See Grant McCool, US Judge Approves Parmalat Ex-Auditors Settlement, 
REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSN1125315520100311?type=marketsNews; see also Stipulation and Agreement 
on Settlement at 11, In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(No. 04 MD 1653(LAK)); Andrew Longstreth, Parmalat Shareholders Milk Small 
Settlements from Auditors, LAW.COM (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/Pub 
Article.jsp?id=1202435772952 (discussing the details of the settlement). 
175 See Longstreth, supra note 174.  
176 See id. 
177 See id. (citing statements by the plaintiffs’ co-lead counsel that there was no 
guarantee of proving the global and U.S. accounting firms controlled their Italian 
counterparts); see also Chad Bray, Auditors Reach $15M Settlement in Parmalat 
Holder Case, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Nov. 19, 2009. 
178 See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 451–52, 455–56. 
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Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc.179  The 
court, however, failed to consider that Stoneridge’s holding that 
“ ‘the conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the 
elements or preconditions for liability’ ” precludes common law 
theories of liability under section 10(b).180 
III. REJECTING VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ACTUAL 
CONTROL  
On three occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected 
attempts to impose liability under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act in the absence of a primary violation by the 
defendant.181  Nevertheless, lower courts have generally taken an 
expansive view of secondary liability under 10(b), particularly in 
the area of vicarious liability for violations committed by an 
employee or agent.182  These courts have rejected arguments that 
control person liability under section 20(a) provides an effective—
and exclusive—means to impose liability on those who control 
primary violators of section 10(b), even though the result is that 
liability under 20(b) becomes redundant.183  Many courts are 
driven to apply vicarious liability under 10(b) because some 
federal courts of appeals have imposed too high a burden on 
control person liability claims brought under section 20(a) by 
requiring culpable participation.184  Rather than applying a 
culpable participation standard, which is at odds with the 
language of the statute and congressional intent, courts should 
 
179 See id. at 449–51 (discussing Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008)). Subsequent decisions have called into question the 
viability of vicarious liability suits under section 10(b). See In re Tronox, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., No. 09 Civ. 6220(SAS), 2010 WL 2835545, at *8 n.120 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 
2010) (questioning whether claims for vicarious liability can be brought under 
§ 10(b) following the Second Circuit’s decision in Pacific Investment Management 
Co., LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
180 Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (quoting Stoneridge, 522 U.S. at 158).  
181 See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 152–53; Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). 
182 See Laperriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., 526 F.3d 715, 725 & n.21 (11th Cir. 
2008) (finding a seven-to-one split among the other courts of appeals in favor of 
applying vicarious liability to 10(b)). 
183 See, e.g., Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 450–55 (applying common law agency 
liability to section 10(b)). 
184 See id. at 456 & n.83 (discussing the split among the district courts in the 
Second Circuit caused by an unclear standard on culpability); see also supra notes 
252–60 and accompanying text). 
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apply an actual control of the audit standard to claims of 
secondary liability brought against accounting firms for the 
alleged wrongdoing of affiliated accounting firms.185 
A. Section 10(b) Does Not Encompass Vicarious Liability Claims 
The majority of federal courts of appeals to consider the issue 
have concluded that plaintiffs can bring a private cause of action 
under section 10(b) premised on common law theories of 
vicarious liability.186  These decisions are in tension with 
Supreme Court precedent, which rejects a broad view of the 
private 10(b) cause of action and focuses on the express 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.187  Furthermore, these 
decisions conflict with congressional intent as shown through the 
express provision for secondary liability under section 20(a) with 
its good faith defense.188  While corporations should not be 
permitted to profit from the wrongdoing of their employees 
without facing liability, this does not justify imposing secondary 
liability on accounting firms for alleged violations by independent 
accounting firms in other countries.  Rather, the organizational 
structure of accounting firms, as well as public policy concerns 
about the sustainability of the industry, support a narrow view of 
accounting firm liability focused on whether the firm actually 
controlled the audit at issue in the litigation. 
1. Supreme Court Precedent and Legislative Intent Do Not 
Support Vicarious Liability Under Section 10(b) 
In 1933 and 1934, Congress passed major securities reform 
litigation to combat the root causes of the stock market crash of 
 
185 See infra Part III.B.2–3. 
186 See Laperriere, 526 F.3d at 725 & n.21. But see In re Tronox, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
No. 09 Civ. 6220(SAS), 2010 WL 2835545, at *8 n.120 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010). 
187 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158–59 
(2008); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 191 (1994); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). For a 
discussion of pre-Central Bank Supreme Court cases rejecting secondary liability 
claims under 10(b), see Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 90–92, 94–98 (1981) (quoted and cited 
with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 169, 184, 
191); William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carman, Respondeat Superior and the 
Federal Securities Law: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 14–22 
(1983). 
188 See infra Part III.A.2. 
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1929.189  To address perceived widespread fraud in securities 
transactions, Congress enacted section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits the use of “any 
manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities.190  Section 20(a), a companion 
provision of the Act, imposes liability on any party that directly 
or indirectly controls a party that is liable under the Act, unless 
the controlling party acted in good faith and did not induce the 
violation.191  While the legislative history does not indicate 
whether Congress intended section 10(b) to be supplemented by 
common law vicarious liability, the existence of a control liability 
provision in section 20(a), along with the good faith defense that 
is unavailable under the strict liability theories of agency or 
respondeat superior, demonstrates Congress’s intent to hold 
secondary actors accountable when they have acted in bad 
faith.192  This express statement of Congress’s intent is wholly at 
odds with the application of common law strict liability principles 
to private causes of action under 10(b).193 
Each time the Supreme Court has considered a claim of 
vicarious or secondary liability under 10(b), it has roundly 
rejected it.194  Relying instead on the express terms of the statute, 
the Court has consistently limited 10(b) claims to defendants who 
 
189 See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194–96; KING, supra note 55, at 59–61; 
Carson, supra note 100, at 265–73. The Securities Act of 1933 applies to direct or 
indirect sales of securities by the issuer. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (West 2011). The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 covers securities transactions in exchanges and 
over-the-counter markets. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006). 
190 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
191 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). 
192 See Carson, supra note 100, at 270–72; Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 
187, at 22–27. 
193 See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Controlling Person Liability 
Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities 
Act, 53 BUS. LAW. 1, 8 (1997). 
194 See supra Part I.C.1. At least one commentator has argued that the Supreme 
Court has recognized vicarious liability under the Securities Exchange Act in 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See William H. 
Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws—Aiding and 
Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common Law Principles and 
the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 317 (1988). While the Court in Affiliated 
Ute recognized that the bank’s liability was “coextensive” with that of its employees, 
406 U.S. at 154, no precedent was cited to support this holding, and the Supreme 
Court has never cited Affiliated Ute for the proposition that an employer may be 
held vicariously liable under the Securities Exchange Act. 
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actually commit a primary violation of the statute.195  For 
example, in Ernst & Ernst, the Court correctly found that 
Congress’s use of the words “manipulative” and “deceptive” 
strongly suggest that 10(b) proscribes only “knowing or 
intentional misconduct,” not a negligent failure to act.196  The 
Court reiterated this holding in Central Bank, when it properly 
rejected attempts to impose secondary liability on those who aid 
and abet manipulative or deceptive conduct because 10(b) does 
not proscribe aiding and abetting conduct.197  Most recently, in 
Stoneridge, the Supreme Court rejected secondary liability under 
10(b) packaged as “scheme liability.”198  First, the Court 
reiterated its position that the scope of the judicially created 
private cause of action under 10(b) is delineated by the text of the 
statute alone.199  Second, the Court found that the PSLRA, which 
Congress passed in response to Central Bank, modified section 
10(b) to further restrict, rather than expand, the 10(b) private 
cause of action.200 
The primary reason that the Supreme Court has consistently 
refused to broaden the private cause of action under 10(b) is that 
it was created by judicial decision, not by the statute.201  The 
Court has stated that the “decision to extend the cause of action 
is for Congress, not for us.”202  As a result, the Court has refused 
to expand the scope of 10(b) because of its remedial effect,203 
relying instead on provisions of the statute that expanded 
governmental enforcement rather than private actions.204 
 
195 See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 187, at 14–22 (contending that “the 
Supreme Court has specifically rejected several of the rationales . . . advanced by 
appellate courts in upholding a plaintiff’s right to hold the defendants liable under 
respondeat superior”). 
196 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). 
197 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 176–77 (1994). 
198 Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–64 
(2008). 
199 See id. at 157. 
200 See id. at 162–63. 
201 See id.; Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 179–80; Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210. 
202 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165. 
203 See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199–200; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 
695 (1980) (“[G]eneralized references to the remedial purposes of the securities laws 
will not justify reading a provision more broadly than its language and the statutory 
scheme reasonably permit.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (“The invocation of the 
‘remedial purposes’ of the 1934 Act is similarly unavailing.”). 
204 Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165–66.  
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Despite the Supreme Court’s consistent position, some courts 
have held that plaintiffs can pursue vicarious liability claims 
under 10(b), reasoning that liability is based on the relationship 
between the defendant and the primary violator, not the 
defendant’s conduct.205  In sustaining vicarious liability under 
10(b), some district courts206 have relied on appellate court 
decisions upholding a corporation’s liability for its employee’s 
violation of 10(b) on the grounds that a “corporation can only act 
through its employees and agents.”207  This remains the majority 
position208 because its supporters believe that without vicarious 
liability under 10(b), investment banks, brokerage firms, and 
other corporations will escape liability for the misdeeds of their 
employees.209  These lower court decisions, however, ignore the 
repeated holdings of the Supreme Court that liability under 10(b) 
is defined by the defendant’s conduct, not by its relationship with 
 
205 See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 291 n.73 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
206 See, e.g., id.; In re WorldCom, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288(DLC), 2003 
WL 21488087, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003). 
207 See Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 100–
01 (2d Cir. 2001) (involving allegations that an employee of an investment bank 
corporation violated 10(b)). In addition to Suez Equity, some courts that have applied 
vicarious liability to 10(b) claims have relied on the Third Circuit’s reasoning in 
AT&T, Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1431 (3d Cir. 1994). 
However, AT&T did not address a Securities Act violation, but a violation of the 
Lanham (Trademark) Act. Id. at 1430. In that context, the Third Circuit simply 
refused to import Central Bank’s holding into federal trademark law, an area never 
addressed in Central Bank. See id. (“[W]e do not believe that the [Supreme] Court’s 
restrictive reading of the [Securities] Exchange Act impacts on the determination of 
the scope of liability under the Lanham Act.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, AT&T is 
irrelevant to determining whether vicarious liability claims may be brought under 
10(b).  
208 See supra note 68. This is not, however, a universal position. Compare 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 386 
(5th Cir. 2007) (finding that the Supreme Court “conclusively foreclosed the 
application of secondary liability under 10(b)”), with Parmalat, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 
291 n.73 (finding that Central Bank “does not eliminate corporate defendants’ 
liability for the misrepresentations or manipulations of their agents”).  
209 See generally Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and Judicially 
Implementing the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior 
Liability Under Section 10(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1343–96 (1997) (discussing a 
number of arguments in favor of retaining vicarious liability under section 10(b), 
including the statute’s defining “person” to include a corporation, Congress’s failure 
to exclude vicarious liability, and policy considerations, such as promoting greater 
control of agents). 
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another party.210  Rather than supplementing 10(b) with common 
law vicarious liability, lower courts should follow the instruction 
of the Supreme Court, which has recognized that section 20(a), 
the control person provision, provides the means to impose 
liability on secondary actors.211  The Court has relied on the 
existence of secondary liability under 20(a) in rejecting secondary 
liability under section 10(b).212  In Central Bank, the Supreme 
Court admonished lower courts not to take it upon themselves to 
graft common law liability principles onto 10(b) when the text of 
the statute governs the outer limits of liability.213  As the Court 
instructed, the “fact that Congress chose to impose some forms of 
secondary liability, but not others, indicates a deliberate 
congressional choice with which the courts should not 
interfere.”214 
2. Vicarious Liability Under 10(b) Renders 20(a) Redundant 
Permitting vicarious liability under section 10(b) violates a 
“cardinal principle” of statutory construction because it renders 
section 20(a) redundant.  One reason courts have been willing to 
impose secondary liability under both sections 10(b) and 20(a) 
appears to be a lack of distinction between primary and 
secondary liability.215  Under a vicarious liability analysis, the 
 
210 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 
(2008) (“The conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the elements or 
preconditions for liability . . . .” (emphasis added)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (“When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of 
manipulation and deception, . . . we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the 
statute to negligent conduct.” (emphasis added)). 
211 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 184 (1994). 
212 See id. (“Congress did not overlook secondary liability when it created the 
private rights of action in the 1934 Act. Section 20 of the 1934 Act imposes liability 
on controlling persons . . . .” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
213 See id. at 183–84. 
214 Id. at 184 (emphasis added). The Central Bank dissent recognized that the 
Court’s holding “at the very least casts serious doubt . . . on other forms of secondary 
liability” other than aiding and abetting. Id. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 
Fischel, supra note 187, at 96–98 (cited with approval by the Court in Central Bank, 
511 U.S. at 184).  
215 See In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). “At the outset, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Bank does not amount 
to a categorical prohibition on claims against secondary actors such as accountants.” 
Id. However, the Supreme Court emphasized in Central Bank that accountants and 
others could only be held liable for primary violations of section 10(b) if “all of the 
requirements for primary liability . . . are met.” Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. 
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only relevant consideration is whether the primary violation 
occurred within the scope of an agency or employment 
relationship.216  No consideration of the conduct or good faith of 
the control defendant is appropriate, and no fault on the part of 
the control defendant is necessary to impose liability.217  The 
imposition of common law strict liability, therefore, contradicts 
the express language of section 20(a), which provides an 
affirmative, good faith defense.218  The application of vicarious 
liability also conflicts with the legislative history, which indicates 
that Congress did not intend to hold control persons strictly 
liable but chose to afford them a good faith defense.219 
Nevertheless, lower courts generally have treated vicarious 
liability under 10(b) as an alternative to section 20(a) liability, 
giving plaintiffs the option of pleading either, or both.  Whether a 
plaintiff pleads vicarious liability under 10(b) or control liability 
under 20(a), the end result is the same:  The control defendant is 
subject to secondary liability for another party’s primary 
violation of the Securities Exchange Act.  The only noteworthy 
distinction is that a defendant sued under 20(a) enjoys the 
protection of the good faith affirmative defense, while a 
defendant sued vicariously under common law agency principles 
receives no such protection.  Given that both approaches provide 
the same outcome, no rational plaintiff would ever sue a 
secondary actor only under 20(a) because of the risk of losing the 
case if the defendant prevails on the good faith defense. 
 
216 See Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 187, at 11, 27–28; Kuehnle, supra note 
194, at 320 (“One is primarily liable, then, if he or she directly does, alone or with 
others, an act prohibited by the statute. Secondary violators are those who, though 
they do not perform the act, have responsibility for it through assistance or a 
relationship with the primary violator.”). 
217 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 291 n.73 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(finding that “the principal is held liable on a theory of agency ‘not because it 
committed some wrongdoing . . . but because its status merits responsibility for the 
tortious actions of its agent’ ” (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve 
Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1431 (3d Cir. 1994) (a case involving the Lanham Act))); 
Fitzpatrick & Carman, supra note 187, at 13 (“Once a court determines that liability 
may be found under respondeat superior, any discussion of a firm’s duty to supervise 
or its negligent actions becomes irrelevant.”); Prentice, supra note 209, at 1332, 
1350. 
218 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006); see also infra Part III.B. 
219 See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 193, at 8–9 (“Legislative history 
clearly supports congressional intent . . . to reject a standard of conduct which 
imposes strict liability” on secondary actors.). 
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When plaintiffs have no rational basis to employ section 
20(a), because vicarious liability under 10(b) provides all the 
same benefits and more, 20(a) has been made redundant.220  Such 
a result is impermissible under the cannons of statutory 
construction employed by the Supreme Court, which has 
frequently “cautioned against reading a text in a way that makes 
part of it redundant.”221  Section 20(a) expresses a strong 
congressional intent to impose liability on secondary control 
actors, but it also demonstrates an equally strong desire to not 
impose liability on controlling parties that have acted in good 
faith.222  By incorporating strict liability common law principles 
into claims brought under section 10(b), courts have subverted 
the will of Congress as evidenced by the affirmative defense in 
20(a) and have rejected the Supreme Court’s teachings not to 
read section 10(b) in a way that makes 20(a) redundant. 
3. Policy Considerations Support Limiting Section 10(b) to 
Primary Violators 
Accounting firms occupy a precarious position in the realm of 
securities law liability.  The work of auditors necessarily involves 
the exercise of a significant amount of judgment,223 which leaves 
accounting firms open to massive liability based on hindsight.  
Shareholders frequently sue a corporation’s auditors after fraud 
or other financial misfeasance is disclosed because of the 
potential for large recovery and the likelihood that accounting 
firms will settle rather than fight the suit.224  As a result, 
“[l]itigation-related expenses are a significant component of 
auditing firms’ cost structures,”225 with the primary risk coming 
 
220 See Fischel, supra note 187, at 94 n.83. Properly read, the two statutes have 
complementary roles: section 10(b) applies to primary violators while section 20(a) 
applies to secondary control persons, subject to the limits of the good faith defense. 
221 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 669 
(2007); see TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of 
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, 
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.’ ” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))). 
222 See infra Part III.B.1.  
223 See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 89 (indicating that “[a]udit quality is 
often thought to include the experience and technical capability of the auditing firm 
partners and staff”). 
224 See Mark, supra note 51, at 1106–07. 
225 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at II:7.  
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from large “big ticket liability” suits.226  When a large corporation 
like Enron or Parmalat collapses, accounting firms are subject to 
liability for the full market value of investors’ losses, which is 
typically many billions of dollars.227  Over the past ten years, the 
four largest global accounting firms have collectively paid out 
more than $5.86 billion to settle such claims.228  Accounting firms 
also face regulatory causes of action and, possibly, criminal 
actions when fraud is uncovered.229  For the most part, 
accounting firms have no way to insure against the risk posed by 
billion-dollar judgments because of the uncertainty regarding the 
extent of their potential liability.230 
Together with the sheer size of the potential liability they 
face, accounting firms’ unique structure cautions against 
imposing secondary liability under section 10(b).  First, because 
global accounting firms are organized as independent national 
partnerships, their control over affiliated firms largely consists of 
setting common standards and procedures and enforcing 
compliance with these procedures.231  A global firm’s disciplinary 
power is limited to terminating its relationship with its member 
firm, which can continue to practice under a new name.232  
Second, state and foreign laws limit an accounting firm’s ability 
to control its affiliates by restricting ownership and mandating a 
partnership structure.233  Third, the accounting industry is 
 
226 Talley, supra note 62, at 1644.  
227 See id. at 1642 (“Auditors now face enhanced vulnerabilities to liability risks 
that—at least according to some—threaten the very viability of the industry as we 
know it.”); ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at II:7 (“The largest U.S. 
public companies have enormous market capitalization and, if a large cap company 
becomes insolvent or suffers a significant diminution in market value, such market 
loss often greatly exceeds the total capital of the auditing firm which audited that 
company.”). 
228 See Tammy Whitehouse, Audit Firms Sure To Face New Litigation, Experts 
Say, COMPLIANCE WK., July 22, 2009, available at http://www.complianceweek.com/ 
blog/whitehouse/2009/07/22/audit-firms-sure-to-face-new-litigation-experts-say/. 
229 See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 34; Talley, supra note 62, at 1649. 
230 See Talley, supra note 62, at 1642 n.5. 
231 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10; GAO REPORT, 
supra note 26, at 8–9. 
232 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 640 F. Supp. 2d 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(describing the powers of the global firm Grant Thornton International as extending 
only to “demotion of a member firm to correspondent status, hiring of new partners 
for the member firm, termination of existing personnel, and expulsion of the member 
firm”). 
233 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at V:10; CENTER FOR 
AUDIT QUALITY, supra note 28, at 23 n.5. 
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currently highly concentrated, with just four global accounting 
networks auditing nearly all major auditing publicly held 
corporations.234  As a result, the loss of even one global 
accounting network to a large civil judgment would likely cause a 
significant reduction in corporations’ choice of outside auditors,235 
negatively impacting auditor independence and increasing audit 
costs.236  Fourth, because U.S. accounting firms are often much 
larger than their foreign counterparts, plaintiffs are more likely 
to sue the deep-pocketed U.S. firm rather than the less well-
funded local accounting firm that committed the alleged 
wrongdoing.237 
Some commentators have argued in favor of greater liability 
for accounting firms based on a number of factors.238  First, 
accounting firms collectively earn billions of dollars each year.239  
Second, accounting firms are not seen as being completely 
transparent in their operations.240  Third, accountants and 
auditors owe a fiduciary duty to investors and the public, which 
the Supreme Court has recognized.241  Fourth, global accounting 
firms do exercise a significant degree of control over their 
member firms in setting standards, monitoring compliance, and 
regulating use of the brand name.242  In addition, some have 
asked whether the market really would suffer from the loss of 
another global accounting firm, since other large accounting 
firms and smaller firms could absorb much of its audit work and 
its employees.243 
 
234 See supra Part I.A. 
235 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at VIII:3; GAO REPORT, 
supra note 26, at 34–35. 
236 See GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 35–36. 
237 Called To Account—The Future of Auditing, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2004.  
238 See generally Mark, supra note 51, at 1174–210.  
239 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at II:1 (“In 2007, the four 
largest global network firms reported, in the aggregate, approximately $90 billion in 
total revenues.”). 
240 See id. at II:8 (“The largest [accounting] firms provide only limited 
information to the investing public about the sources of their revenue, their 
governance practices, the amount of their earnings, and their financial condition.”). 
241 See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18 (1984). 
242 See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text. Although strong evidence of 
control, these factors have generally been found to be insufficient to establish control 
person liability. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
243 See Mark, supra note 51, at 1195–96; Talley supra note 62, at 1691–92 
(noting that after the collapse of Arthur Andersen, “displaced employees appeared to 
be absorbed by other firms in a relatively orderly way, not only by other large firms, 
but also by second-tier accounting firms”).  
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Nevertheless, secondary liability under section 10(b) is 
unnecessary to achieve the policy aims its supporters claim it 
protects, and in the context of accounting firm liability, it creates 
much harm.  Secondary liability under section 10(b) is 
unnecessary to hold an accounting firm liable as an employer or 
as a control person because a control defendant sued under 
section 20(a) must establish that it took “some precautionary 
measures . . . to prevent an injury caused by an employee” to 
avoid liability.244  To establish good faith, an accounting firm 
sued as a control defendant may be required to show that it 
“maintain[ed] an adequate system of internal control, and that 
[it] maintain[ed] the system in a diligent manner.”245  While 
supervisory liability may not be absolute, plaintiffs can establish 
liability on the part of a control defendant by showing a negligent 
failure to supervise or control.246  This is hardly an 
insurmountable hurdle.  In addition, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that secondary actors remain subject to primary 
liability for their own violations of 10(b).247  In sum, the structure 
of global accounting firms, the highly concentrated nature of the 
industry, and the implications for auditor independence if a 
global firm were to collapse under a large civil judgment all 
caution against imposing secondary liability outside the 
statutory limits created by Congress.248 
B. Section 20(a) Liability Should Be Limited to Firms That 
Actually Controlled the Audit 
Having established that section 20(a) is the proper vehicle 
for imposing secondary liability, the next issue is determining 
 
244 Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1979).  
245 Id.  
246 See id. 
247 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (“Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, 
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) 
on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator 
under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 
are met.”).  
248 The adverse impacts caused by the collapse of a large global accounting firm, 
such as decreased competition, reduced auditor independence, and increased audit 
costs, are widely recognized. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 26, at 32–36; 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big To Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need 
To Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1700–02 
(2006). See generally Talley, supra note 62. 
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what standard of control should be applied.  In 20(a), Congress 
sought to impose liability on “[e]very person who, directly or 
indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this 
chapter” of the Act, unless the control defendant acted in good 
faith and did not induce the violation.249  Properly understood 
within the context of the legislative history, the good faith 
exception should be read as an affirmative defense, not as an 
element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.250  Additionally, the 
standard of control for secondary liability of accounting firms for 
audits performed by affiliated accounting firms should be an 
actual control of the audit standard, not a general right to control 
standard.251  
1. Culpable Participation Is an Affirmative Defense 
The phrase “culpable participation” does not appear in the 
text of section 20(a).252  The federal courts of appeals, 
nevertheless, cannot agree on whether the plaintiff must 
establish culpability as an element of the cause of action, or 
whether the defendant must raise a lack of culpability as an 
affirmative defense.253  The Second Circuit was the first to 
require that plaintiffs establish that a control defendant was a 
culpable participant in the underlying violation of the Securities 
Exchange Act.254  The Second Circuit reasoned that the text and 
the legislative history offered “no evidence” that Congress 
intended that anyone should be “an insurer against false or 
misleading statements made non-negligently or in good faith.”255 
Rather than stick with this simple, yet implausible standard, 
the Second Circuit’s decisions applying culpable participation 
have hopelessly confused the issue.  In Marbury Management, 
Inc. v. Kohn, the court backed away from requiring plaintiff to 
prove the control person’s culpability, reasoning that “[d]ifferent 
 
249 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).  
250 See infra Part III.B.1. 
251 See infra Part III.B.2. 
252 See 15 U.S.C. 78t(a).  
253 See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “Erisa” 
Litig.), Nos. MDL-1446, Civ.A. H-01-3624, 2003 WL 230688, at *9–10 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 
28, 2003) (discussing the circuit split); Rieger v. Drabinsky (In re Livent, Inc., 
Noteholders Sec. Litig.), 151 F. Supp. 2d 371, 413–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing the 
split both among the federal courts of appeals and within the Second Circuit).  
254 See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973). 
255 Id. (quoting Kohn v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir. 
1972)). 
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considerations control the application of respondeat superior 
principles.”256  Despite this statement, the Second Circuit 
reversed course again in Securities & Exchange Commission v. 
First Jersey Securities, Inc., reiterating its earlier holding that 
plaintiffs must show that the control defendant was “in some 
meaningful sense [a] culpable participant[ ] in the fraud.”257  
Determined not to leave well-enough alone, in the very next 
paragraph of First Jersey, the court seemed to shift the burden 
back to the defendant, stating that “[o]nce the plaintiff makes out 
a prima facie case of section 20(a) liability, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to show that he acted in good faith and that he did 
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the 
violation.”258  The Second Circuit has repeatedly readopted its 
First Jersey test without shedding any light as to which party 
bears the burden of culpability.259 
Not surprisingly, this schizophrenic approach has resulted in 
differing standards being applied by the district courts within the 
Second Circuit.260  The court in Parmalat sided with the majority 
of circuits outside the Second Circuit, holding that lack of 
culpability is a good faith defense that the accounting firm 
defendants can raise, not an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case.261  Other district courts applying 20(a) have required 
plaintiffs to prove a control defendant’s culpable participation.262  
Still other courts have avoided the issue entirely, deciding claims 
 
256 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). 
257 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Gordon v. 
Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1085 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
258 Id. at 1473 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
259 See, e.g., Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 
101–02 (2d Cir. 2001); Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 720 (2d Cir. 1998); First 
Jersey, 101 F.3d at 1472–73. 
260 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456 n.83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(discussing the split); Jeff G. Hammel & Robert J. Malionek, Elusive Standard To 
Plead § 20(a) Control Person Liability, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 5, 2007, at 4. 
261 See Parmalat, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 456. 
262 See Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221, 245–46 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 433, 489–90 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005); see also Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., No. 09 Civ. 0118(VM), 2010 WL 
3341636, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2010) (treating control as analogous to culpable 
participation). As discussed infra Part III.B.2, a control defendant may have actual 
control of the primary violator without being a culpable participant in the violation. 
The distinction between control and culpability—or scienter—is critical because, as 
discussed in this Section, culpable participation is an affirmative defense that the 
control defendant may raise, whereas control is an element of a prima facie section 
20(a) claim, which the plaintiff must establish. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006). 
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under 20(a) on the more narrow issue of whether the 20(a) 
defendant had “control” of the party that committed the actual 
violation.263 
The language of the statute indicates that lack of culpability 
is an affirmative defense to be raised by the alleged controlling 
party.  Structurally, the elements of lack of culpability, good 
faith, and an absence of inducement appear after the main part 
of the statute and are separated by a comma and the word 
“unless.”264  A nearly identical exculpatory clause was added to 
section 15, an analogous control person provision of the 
Securities Act of 1933, to soften the imposition of strict liability 
by allowing for a defense of good faith.265  In addition, the 
wording that Congress chose, “unless the controlling person acted 
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act,” 
more naturally reads as an affirmative defense than as an 
element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.266  Had Congress wanted 
to include culpability as part of the prima facie case under 20(a), 
it could have required plaintiffs to show “bad faith and 
inducement in the violative acts” by the controlling person.267  
Despite the continuing confusion wrought by the Second Circuit’s 
bifurcated test, the good faith and absence of inducement 
elements of section 20(a) are best treated as an affirmative 
defense that accounting firms and other control defendants may 
raise on a motion to dismiss.268 
 
263 See In re Asia Pulp & Paper Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 391, 395–96 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
264 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); see Kuehnle, supra note 194, at 364; Lowenfels & 
Bromberg, supra note 193, at 3–7. 
265 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.27 (1976) (indicating 
that Congress amended section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, a corollary provision 
to section 20(a), to include a good faith defense as it had done with 20(a)); Fischel, 
supra note 187, at 98–99 (stating that section 15, as originally passed in 1933, 
imposed strict liability on control persons but that Congress amended the law in 
1934 to include the same good faith defense as in section 20(a) to address concerns 
that strict liability would impose liability on nonculpable parties); Prentice, supra 
note 209, at 1404–05. 
266 See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 193, at 6–7. 
267 See id. 
268 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
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2. The Proper Standard of Control Is Actual Control of the 
Audit 
Like the split over culpable participation, the meaning of 
“control” under section 20(a) is a source of much debate.  
Congress did not define “control” in the Act.  Some courts, 
including the Second Circuit, have applied the definition of 
“control” in the SEC’s regulations, which permits liability based 
on the power or right to control generally the party that 
committed the primary violation, rather than the application of 
actual control.269  The Parmalat Court similarly applied this 
power to control standard.270  While the SEC’s regulations may be 
considered in defining “control” under 20(a), they are not 
dispositive.  Rather, the Supreme Court has rejected the agency’s 
interpretation in other contexts where that interpretation was 
broader than the statutory language.271  Use of a broad agency 
interpretation of “control” also fails to take account of the 
Supreme Court’s consistently narrow reading of the private 
causes of action under the Securities Exchange Act in 
conformance with the express language of the statute.272 
Other courts have followed the Eighth Circuit’s standard, 
which requires actual control over the primary violator’s general 
activities and the power to control the specific transaction at 
issue in the litigation.273  This standard more closely addresses 
the central issue in secondary liability claims brought under 
20(a): whether the control person defendant could or did control 
the specific act that allegedly violated the Securities Exchange 
Act.  The Eighth Circuit’s standard, however, is undermined by 
the fact that it was developed within case law that treated 
section 10(b) as a broad remedial statute,274 a view that the 
 
269 See SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472–73 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(“Control over a primary violator may be established by showing that the defendant 
possessed ‘the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies 
of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or 
otherwise.’ ” (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2010))). 
270 See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
271 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212–14 (1976) (rejecting the 
SEC’s interpretation of the term “manipulative” in 10(b) as it included negligent 
conduct, and noting that the agency’s power extends only to giving effect to 
Congress’s intent, not making law). 
272 See supra Part III.A.1. 
273 See Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985). 
274 See id. at 630 (citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967)). 
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Supreme Court has expressly rejected.275  As a result, the Eighth 
Circuit’s standard is in doubt and subject to challenge. 
The better reasoned decisions on “control” chart a middle 
course.  Applying a pragmatic approach, these courts have 
applied a standard of “actual control of the transactions in 
question.”276  In light of the limits imposed by the statute, which 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, this standard 
considers the relationship between the control person and the 
primary violator with respect to the alleged violation, rather than 
considering their relationship generally.  As such, the standard 
affirms the often-stated principle that the “mere existence of a 
parent/subsidiary relationship may be an insufficient basis from 
which to infer control.”277  Similarly, this standard does not 
require a showing of the control person’s scienter, as is required 
by the decisions of courts that require that the plaintiff establish 
culpable participation by the control person.278  This standard, 
therefore, balances the need to hold those who control—or should 
control—primary violators accountable, while not reading section 
20(a) in such an overly broad manner that it conflicts with 
Congress’s intent to limit liability for control persons. 
While the actual control of the transaction standard is more 
narrowly focused, by no means does it provide blanket immunity 
for control person defendants.  Rather, control persons still face 
liability for failing to act in good faith when they actually control 
the primary violator.279  A control defendant, therefore, may be 
held liable under 20(a) for negligently failing to supervise or 
control an employee or agent.  The control defendant is, thus, not  
 
 
 
275 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199–200. 
276 Ross v. Bolton, No. 83 CIV. 8244 (WK), 1989 WL 80428, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
4, 1989), vacated on other grounds by No. 83 CIV. 8244 (WK), 1989 WL 80425 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1989) (reversing an erroneous dismissal of common law fraud 
claims for jurisdictional reasons); see In re Tronox, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 
6220(SAS), 2010 WL 2835545, at *14 n.198 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010); In re Global 
Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 910(GEL), 2005 WL 1875445, at *3–4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2005) (applying the standard to section 15 of the Securities Act 
(15 U.S.C. § 77o) an analogous control person statute to section 20(a)). 
277 Global Crossing, 2005 WL 1875445, at *4. 
278 See Tronox, 2010 WL 2835545, at *15 (rejecting argument that plaintiff must 
establish culpable participation). 
279 See supra Part III.B.1. 
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vicariously liable for another’s primary violation but is held 
secondarily liable for its failure to control the transaction at issue 
in good faith. 
This actual control of the transaction standard has been 
successfully applied by courts in considering section 20(a) claims.  
For example, in Global Crossing, the court refused to dismiss a 
secondary liability claim brought against an investment bank 
under 20(a) where the entity that had committed the primary 
violation of 10(b) was a “wholly owned subsidiary” of the parent 
company.280  The Global Crossing Court concluded that the 
parent company actually controlled the party that had committed 
the securities violation because “the directors of both 
corporations were interchangeable” and the parent company had 
“direct involvement in the day-to-day operations” of its 
subsidiary and, presumably, could have prevented the violation 
had the parent acted in good faith.281 
The actual control of the transaction standard has also been 
applied to claims of secondary liability against accounting firms.  
For example, in In re Lernout & Hauspie Securities Litigation, 
the district court applied this standard by examining what role 
each accounting firm played with regard to the alleged securities 
violations.282  Investors in a Belgian speech technology 
corporation alleged 10(b) and 20(a) violations by KPMG Belgium, 
the corporation’s auditors, as well as KPMG International—the 
global firm—and the KPMG member firms in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Singapore.283  First addressing primary 
liability, the court refused to dismiss the 10(b) claims against 
KPMG Belgium because it had actually performed the audits and 
had signed off on the speech company’s financial reports.284  The 
court also rejected KPMG U.S.’s motion to dismiss because the 
U.S. firm’s partners had played “a significant role in drafting the 
financial statements and in conducting the audit.”285  By contrast, 
the court dismissed the claims against KPMG UK and KPMG 
Singapore on the grounds that their having reviewed audits and 
commented on documents was insufficient to trigger primary 
 
280 Global Crossing, 2005 WL 1875445, at *4. 
281 Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
282 230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 175–76 (D. Mass. 2002). 
283 See id. at 156–57. 
284 See id. at 163–64. 
285 Id. at 166. 
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liability under Central Bank.286  Turning to secondary liability, 
the court rejected section 20(a) claims against KPMG 
International, KPMG U.S., and KPMG UK on the grounds that 
there was “no evidence that KPMG U.S. or KPMG UK ever 
actually exercised control over KPMG Belgium in the issuance of 
audit reports.”287 
The Lernout & Hauspie Court conducted a proper analysis of 
whether each accounting firm was actually involved in the audit 
at issue in the litigation.  Where the Belgian and U.S. firms were 
substantially involved in preparing the audit reports alleged to 
be deceptive, the court refused to dismiss the claims based on 
10(b) primary liability.288  With regard to secondary liability 
under 20(a), however, the court rejected the control liability 
claims because the plaintiffs had failed to establish that any 
KPMG entity had actually controlled KPMG Belgium for the 
purpose of the particular audit at issue.289 
3. The Actual Control of the Audit Standard Provides an 
Effective Means of Reaching Control Defendants 
The actual control of the audit standard is particularly 
useful for analyzing the Parmalat plaintiffs’ secondary liability 
claims against the Deloitte Defendants.  In Parmalat, Deloitte-
Italy was alleged to have committed the primary violation of 
10(b) by either discovering and failing to report, or recklessly 
ignoring, the fraud committed by Parmalat’s officers.290  DTT, the 
global firm, was alleged to have controlled the Parmalat audit by 
arbitrating the dispute between Deloitte-Italy and Deloitte-Brazil 
at the center of the audit.291  Under the analysis undertaken in 
Lernout & Hauspie and Global Crossing, this intervention by 
DTT into the particular Parmalat audit at issue in the litigation 
likely raises an issue of fact as to whether the global firm 
actually controlled Deloitte-Italy for the purposes of that 
particular audit.  Application of the actual control of the audit 
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 standard would, thus, result in the same outcome with regard to 
secondary liability claims against DTT as the Parmalat Court’s 
analysis.292 
With regard to Deloitte-U.S., however, no facts indicate that 
it actually controlled any audit of Parmalat.  Plaintiffs alleged, 
and the court relied on, the fact that Deloitte-U.S. and DTT 
shared some executives, Deloitte-U.S. guaranteed loans for its 
global firm, and Deloitte-U.S. persuaded the global firm to sell its 
consulting business.293  None of these allegations demonstrates 
any actual control by Deloitte-U.S. of DTT or Deloitte-Italy for 
the purposes of the audit at issue in the litigation.  Under the 
actual control of the audit standard, Deloitte-U.S. could not be 
held secondarily liable because there was no evidence that it 
actually controlled another party involved in the auditing of 
Parmalat. 
Imposing liability only on those firms that actually 
controlled a primary violator has numerous advantages.  First, 
by limiting liability to those entities that actually controlled the 
audit, the actual control of the audit standard meaningfully 
addresses the systemic risk posed by the loss of a major global 
accounting network when a rogue member acts outside of the 
legitimate control that the global firm had over the member.  On 
the other hand, accounting firms that actually controlled an 
audit cannot escape liability if they failed to control or supervise 
in good faith.  Second, the standard recognizes and respects the 
unique organizational structure of accounting firms by not 
conflating independent national partnerships and their global 
network entity into a single persona.  Respecting the 
independent partnership structure of national accounting firms 
is important because a third party’s perception is not a basis for 
measuring liability.294  While this standard may limit an 
investor’s recovery to the entities that were actually involved in 
or controlled the audit, courts routinely limit investors’ recovery 
against other defendants, such as boards of directors, by applying 
 
292 See id. at 455–56. 
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294 See Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, Nos. 00 Civ. 2284(DLC), 00 Civ. 2498(DLC), 
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a similar “active control” standard.295  Third, by focusing the 
secondary liability analysis on the entity that actually controlled 
the audit, this standard properly correlates liability with actual 
control of the actions that gave rise to the primary violation.  
Such a result is important to promote and protect honest capital 
markets without subjecting accounting firms to the threat of 
massive civil liability. 
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court expressed its concern 
that excessive secondary liability “exacts costs that may disserve 
the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities 
markets,”296 resulting in more harm than good to the securities 
marketplace as a whole.  The investing public will ultimately be 
disserved by the imposition of excessive secondary liability on 
accounting firms.  As the example of Arthur Andersen vividly 
shows, the loss of a large global accounting firm will likely result 
in fewer choices for corporations, fewer safeguards on auditor 
independence, and fewer sources of vital financial information for 
the investing public. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has frequently stated that the private 
cause of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 must be limited to the express conduct proscribed by 
Congress in the Act.  Congress has rejected imposing secondary 
liability through 10(b), choosing instead to rely on section 20(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, which imposes liability on those 
who control a primary violator, subject to a good faith defense.  
The court in In re Parmalat Securities Litigation rejected the 
holding of the Supreme Court and congressional intent when it 
permitted plaintiffs to sue two global accounting firms and two 
U.S. accounting firms under a vicarious liability theory of 10(b).  
Such an approach is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent 
and congressional intent as evidenced by the inclusion of the 
good faith defense in section 20(a), and it is antithetical to the 
notion of holding wrongdoers accountable.   
Because of their size, their role in auditing public companies’ 
financial reports, and their global network structure, large 
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accounting firms are uniquely susceptible to the harm wrought 
by imposing strict secondary liability under 10(b).  The loss of a 
large global accounting firm to a private securities claim would 
have major implications for auditor independence and would 
likely reduce public companies’ options regarding their outside 
auditors, while simultaneously increasing public company audit 
fees.  The solution proposed in this Note, that global accounting 
firms should only face secondary liability under section 20(a) 
when they have actually controlled the audit, balances the need 
to hold accounting firms accountable for their own actions, while 
enabling them to limit liability within the realistic boundaries of 
control that they have over affiliated accounting firms. 
 
